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I.

INTRODUCTION

The development of a separate justice system forjuveniles
owes much to the view that juvenile offenders are less culpable
than adult offenders and more amenable to change.' As an
important corollary, retributive, incapacitative, and deterrent
themes - the central philosophical bases supporting punishment in the criminal justice system - have largely been absent
from the justifications offered for intervention with juvenile
offenders.* Instead, rehabilitative treatment and protective
supervision traditionally
have been the preferred responses to
3
juvenile misbehavior.
t This article revises material presented previously in 35 CRIM. &
DELINQ. 179 (1989). All information is used with permission of both authors
and the publisher.
* Center for Studies in Criminology and Law, University of Florida.
Department of Sociology, University of Florida.
1. See generally Mack, TheJuvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909);
Hazard, The Jurisprudence of Juvenile Deviance, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE
CHILD 4 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); Fox,JuvenileJustice Reform: An Historical
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Platt, The Triumph of Benevolence: The
Origins of the Juvenile Justice System in the United States, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 356 (R. Quinney ed. 1974); A. PLATT, THE CHILDSAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d Ed. 1977).
2. See generally A. CICOUREL, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE (1968); R. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS: CONTEXT AND PROCESS
IN JUVENILE COURT (1969); Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult

Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative for Asking Unanswered Questions, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 515 (1978); L. EMPEY, AMERICAN DELINQUENCY: ITS MEANING AND
CONSTRUCTION (1982); M. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE
TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE (1982).
3. See Fox, supra note 1; Hazard, supra note 1.
Many question whether the juvenile justice system either utilizes
therapeutic techniques.or accomplishes therapeutic ends. With regard to the
former, it can be said that while the philosophical justification for
intervention with young offenders is based on a rehabilitative ideal (See, e.g.,
F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964)), the operational

difference between treatment and punishment is frequently blurred in
practice. With regard to the latter, commentators on the achievements of the
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Notwithstanding the juvenile justice system's nominal orientation toward rehabilitation, from the beginning provisions
were made to exclude some youthful offenders from the protections of the juvenile court.4 For example, it is difficult to
support continued efforts to treat chronic offenders who have
been unresponsive to efforts to rehabilitate them. Similarly, it
is difficult to justify a rehabilitative posture toward youthseven first offenders-who have committed serious violent
crimes that provoke strong societal indignation and fear .for
public safety. These concerns were not and are not easily
assuaged within the range of dispositional alternatives traditionally available to the juvenile. court. It is not surprising,
then, to find that even early on in the history ofjuvenile justice,
juvenile codes were amended to permit the transfer of some
youths to criminal courts for prosecution and punishment.
Today all states have provisions to accept from the juvenile justice system young offenders who are so intractable or dangerous as to warrant adult prosecution. 5
In the last two decades, the transfer of juvenile offenders
to criminal courts has become increasingly controversial.' Dramatic increases in juvenile crime in the 1970s generated public
outrage and loss of confidence in the juvenile justice system.
Highly publicized negative appraisals of treatment programs7
undermined support for rehabilitation-and, concomitantly,
for the juvenile court-and provoked strong pleas for the
adoption of punishment-oriented policies and practices.'
Transfer rates rose, reflecting growing disillusionment with
what were perceived to be lenient, therapeutic responses of the
juvenile court.9 For example, over the period 1971-81, transjuvenile justice system have been almost uniformly negative in their
appraisals of rehabilitative programs (See Wright and Dixon, Community
Treatment ofjuveile Delinquency: A Review of Evaluation Studies, 14 J. OF RES. IN
CRIME & DELINQ. 35 (1977)).
4. D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).

5. Feld, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Harris, Is the Juvenile Justice System "Lenient"?, 18 CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ABSTRACTS 104 (1986).
7. Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 3.5
PUBLIC INTEREST 22 (1974); D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, AND J. WiLus, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT. A SURVEY OF TREATMENT
EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); see also Wright and Dixon, supra note 3.
8. F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILIrATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); see also I. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JuSTICE FOR JUVENILES:
RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1988).
9. There are numerous other signs of disillusionment with the
rehabilitative/treatment orientation of the juvenile court. For example,
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fers to criminal court increased nationally from less than one
percent, to more than five percent, of juvenile arrests."0
The transformation from juvenile to adult status has serious consequences. The status of "juvenile" carries with it a
shield from publicity, protection against extended pre-trial
detention and post-conviction incarceration with adults, and a
guarantee that confinement will not extend beyond the age of
majority. In addition, it provides protection against loss of civil
rights, against disqualification for public employment, and
against the personal status degradation and restriction of legitimate opportunities that often follow a criminal conviction.
Feld has summarized nicely what. is at stake with his observation that, compared to youths processed in the juvenile justice
system, youths treated as adults have a greatly reduced
probability of surviving adolescence with their life chances
intact.
Historically, the transfer of juveniles to criminal court has
been accomplished most commonly by judicial waiver. This
method of transfer was reviewed by the Supreme Court in the
1966 case of Kent v. United States.II There the Court characterized the waiver decision as "critically important" and mandated
a number of procedural safeguards to protect the interest of
the child in having jurisdiction retained by the juvenile court.
These include the right to a hearing, representation by counsel,
several states have recently redefined the purposes of their juvenile justice
systems to include punishment (e.g., California, Florida, Indiana, Minnesota,
Texas, Virginia), while some have introduced desert-based sentencing in the
juvenile court (e.g., New Jersey, Texas, Washington)-. Several state
legislatures have recently enacted statutes exciudinrg certain categories of
offenders from juvenile court jurisdiction (e.g., New York, Illinois), and some
have moved to lower the age of criminal court jurisdiction (e.g., Vermont).
For further discussion of the movement toward a more punishment oriented
approach, see Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U.L. REV. (1988); P.
GREENWOOD, INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS:

(1986).
Krisberg, Schwartz, Litsky, and Austin, The Watershed of Juvenile
Justice Reform, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 5 (1986); D. HAMPARIAN, L. EsTEP. S.
MUNTEAN, R. PRIESTINO, R. SWISHER, P. WALLACE, &J. WHITE, MAJOR ISSUES
SOME NEW PERSPECTIVES

10.

IN JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION AND TRAINING:

BETWEEN

Two

WORLDS

(1982)

[hereinafter

YOUTH

IN ADULT COURTS:

HAMPARIAN].

See also,

Champion, Teenage Felons and Waiver Hearings: Some Recent Trends, 1980-1988,
35 CRIME & DELINQ. 577 (1989); Miller, Changing Legal Paradigms in Juvenile
Justice, in INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR CHRONICJUVENILE OFFENDERS: SOME
NEw PERSPECTIVES (P. Greenwood, ed. 1986).

!1. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedurefor the Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 275 (1984).

12.

383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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access to information considered in reaching the decision to
waive jurisdiction, and a statement of reasons for the waiver.
Although Kent was decided on procedural grounds, the Court,
in an appendix to its decision also enumerated several substan-4
tive criteria' 3 to guide judges in making transfer decisions .
These standards reduce the dangers of arbitrary, capricious,
and discriminatory dispositions inherent in unstructured decision-making, and ensure some degree of equitability to the
transfer process.'" When a state seeks to transfer a youth to
criminal court viz judicial waiver, it bears the substantial burden of marshalling evidence sufficient to convince a presumably treatment-oriented juvenile court judge that a youth is not
amenable to treatment within the juvenile justice 6system and
that he poses a serious danger to the community.'
In keeping with today's increasingly punitive orientation,
many jurisdictions recently have moved to facilitate the prosecution of youths in criminal courts.' 7 Toward that end, three
streamlined methods of transfer are now in use that expedite
transfer by by-passing the risks and inconveniences associated
with thejuvenile waiver hearing. Some states have enacted legislation excluding certain categories of offense-most often,
capital offenses and major felonies-from juvenile court jurisdiction.' Some provide for grand jury indictment of juveniles
charged with certain major felonies.' 9 Under either of these
alternatives, youths charged with any of the enumerated
offenses are automatically tried as adults.
The third and most controversiail transfer mechanism consists of prosecutorial waiver or "direct file." Under this
13. These include the seriousness of the offense (and particularly
whether the offense was a felony against persons in which injury resulted),
prosecutive merit, the sophistication and maturity of the child, the child's
prior offense record, indications of responsiveness to prior rehabilitative
efforts, and the ability of dispositional alternatives available to the juvenile
court to rehabilitate the child or effectively protect the public.
14. Many states have incorporated these criteria into their juvenile
codes either verbatim or with minor modifications.
15. To be sure, interpretation of the standards remains subjective and
there is opportunity for selective emphasis upon individual criteria, but the
exercise of discretion is nonetheless guided to a significant degree.
16. Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative
Alternativefor Asking UnanswerableQuestions, 62 MINN. L. REv. 515 (1978); Feld,
Juvenile Court Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the 'Rehabilitative'
Ideal, 65 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1981).
17. See generally, Hamparian, supra note 10.

18.
19.

E.g., Illinois, Indiana, Oklahoma, Louisiana.
E.g., Florida.
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method, which has been adopted in at least thirteen states, 0
concurrent jurisdiction is given to the juvenile and criminal
courts: It is the prosecutor's charging decision that determines
in which forum the case will be heard. Ordinarily, the prosecutor's decision to file charges in criminal court is nonappealable. 2 ' Moreover, while some prosecutorial waiver statutes
include clear and restrictive criteria to guide their application,
others provide only vague guidelines. 2
Not surprisingly, prosecutorial waiver statutes have been
the object of sharp criticism.2 3 Some commentators fear that
provisions allowing quick and easy transfer invite careless
24
application, or worse, deliberate misapplication and abuse.
Additionally, there is concern that youths who might respond
to therapeutirnterventions or simply "mature out" ofjuvenile
misconduct may be prosecuted in criminal courts and confined
with adults under circumstances that may have decidedly negative effects. 25 Finally, because prosecutorial waiver statutes
greatly expand the power of prosecutors-who historically
have been more concerned with retribution than with rehabilitation-widespread use of prosecutorial waiver seems to signal
a fundamental shift in delinquency policy away from the parens
patriae philosophy that is the cornerstone of the juvenile court
and toward a punitive orientation characteristic of criminal
the
courts. In a real sense, then, prosecutorial waiver threatens
26
very existence of a separate juvenile justice system.
20. E.g., Arkansas, Florida, Nebraska, Wyoming.
21. Except in those few jurisdictions that have established reverse
certification procedures, prosecutorial waiver decisions are virtually
unreviewable and irreversible.
22. Florida's prosecutorial waiver statute is a case in point. After
setting forth broad age and offense criteria for transfer, it directs the
prosecutor to transfer a youth to criminal court "when in his judgment and
discretion, the public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or
imposed." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.04(2)(e)(4)(West 1988). See infra.
23. United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); Mylniec, Juvenile Delinquent or
AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 29 (1976); see
INSTITUrrE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER
BETWEEN COURTS, Standards .L.B, I.I.C, 2.2.A.1, and 2.2.C. (1980).

Adult Convict: The Prosecutor's Choice, 14
also,

24.

Mylniec, supra note 23, at 36-37.

25.

See, R.

DETENTION

LAw

SARRI,

(1974);

UNDER LOCK AND KEY:

JUVENILE IN JAILS AND

BROUGHT TO JUSTICE? JUVENILES, THE COURTS, AND THE

(R. Sarri and Y. Hasenfeld eds. 1976); CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND,
Soler, Litigation on Behalf of Children in Adult

CHILDREN IN ADULTJAILS (1976);
Jails, 34 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY

26. See, for example, C.

190 (1988).

THOMAS & C. FRAZIER, AN EVALUATION REPORT
ON FLORIDA'S SERIOUS OFFENDER PROGRAM 8 (1984).

286

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

This paper examines the philosophy and practice of
prosecutorial waiver in Florida.27 Our study is divided into several parts. In the first section, we examine the provisions of
Florida law relating to prosecutorial waiver. Next, we briefly
review records of juveniles transferred to criminal court statewide for the period 1979-87. These data, which span a time
frame during which prosecutors' transfer powers. were
expanded, permit us to explore the impact of legal change on
trends in transfer. rates and practices. Third, we report the
results of interviews conducted with prosecutors in the juvenile
divisions of each of the state's judicial circuits. These interviews allowed us to gain firsthand information from practicing
prosecutors on their views and practices relating to Florida's
transfer provisions. Fourth, we examine individual-level case
data from two urban counties on characteristics of youths
transferred and the dispositions they received. Finally, drawing
upon the findings of our empirical analyses, we discuss the
problems inherent in applying a broad prosecutorial waiver
statute and offer some recommendations regarding ways to
achieve the aims of the statute in more consistent and equitable
ways.
II.

FLORIDA'S TRANSFER PROVISIONS

Florida law offers three methods for transferring youths
from juvenile to criminal court jurisdiction. The oldest of
these is judicial waiver, which applies to youths fourteen years
of age or older. In 1975 the state legislature incorporated Kent
criteria into the Florida Juvenile Justice Act. 28 Consequently,

the juvenile judge's waiver decision is made only after assessing

the youth's dangerousness and amenability to treatment, as
indicated by such considerations as the current offense, the
prior record, prior treatment interventions, the youth's sophistication and maturity, and the prognosis for further treatment,
as reflected in clinical evaluations.29 Although some commen27. For an expanded discussion of the study and its findings, see
Bishop, Frazier, & Henretta, frosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable
Reform, 35 CRIME & DEUN9. 179 (1989).
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09(2)(West 1988).
29. The judge is assisted in the waiver determination by a report which
details the child's social and offense history. This report is submitted prior to
the waiver hearing, and the child, his parents or guardians, and both defense
counsel and state's attorney have the right to examine it and to question the
parties who conducted the inquiry. Further, if the decision to transfer is
made, the judge must submit specific findings of fact supporting the transfer
decision with respect to each of the Kent criteria.
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tators criticize the Kent criteria for being too broad to provide
objective indicators to guide discretion,-' there is no doubt that
they represent a vast improvement over the standards to be discussed below with respect to prosecutorial waiver.
Florida law also provides a variation on ."legislative
waiver," that is, the exclusion from juvenile court jurisdiction
of youths charged with certain specified offenses. Specifically,
the law provides that the prosecutor shall seek indictment of
'any child, regardless of age, who is charged with a capital or life
felony. 3 ' Prosecutorial discretion is exercised in the selection
of charges. However, once the decision is made to charge one
of the enumerated felonies, transfer is virtually automatic,
insuring some equitability in application.
The final mechanism for removing offenders from the
juvenile system is prosecutorial waiver. The Florida legislature
enacted limited prosecutorial waiver legislation in 1979 and
amended it in 1981 to grant prosecutors almost unlimited discretion with respect to the transfer of sixteen and seventeen
year olds. As amended, the Florida juvenile justice Act permits
the prosecutor to file a bill of information in criminal court on
any child fourteen years of age or older who has previously
been adjudicated delinquent for one of several violent felonies
and who is currently charged with a subsequent such offense,
and on any sixteen- or seventeen-year-old charged with any violation of Florida law "when in his judgment and discretion, the
public interest requires that adult sanctions be considered or
imposed."2

In sum, prosecutors have rather limited powers over the
transfer of youths under the ages of sixteen and seventeen.
They may transfer any sixteen- or seventeen-year-old charged
with any felony. Any sixteen- or seventeen-year-old charged
with a misdemeanor or even a local ordinance violation may
also be charged as an adult if he has had two prior adjudications of delinquency, one of which involved a felony. This discretionary power is carried out without a hearing, without any
statement of reasons, without counsel, and without any show30. See, e.g., for example, Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on
Teen-Aged Axe-Murderers, Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 LAw AND
INEQUALrrY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (1990).
31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5)(c) (West 1988).
32. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.04(2)(e)(4) (West 1988). Remand from
criminal court to juvenile court is possible upon request of the child only if
the child is presently charged with a misdemeanor and does not have two
prior delinquency adjudications, one of which involved a felony.
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ing that the youth is either dangerous or nonamenable to treat-

ment in the juvenile justice system.

1.

III. TRANSFERS IN FLORIDA, 1979-1987
Statewide transfer data for 1979-87 are presented in Table
TABLE 1

JUVENILE TRANSFERS IN FLORIDA,

1979-87

Year

Total
Deliquency
Filings

Percent
Transferred

Percent
Direct
Filed

1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

66,504
42,797
48,105
41,088
38,398
41,492
46,599
50,289
57,298

1.29
2.80
2.83
8.85
7.99
5.32
5.61
6.41
7.35

48
54
61
68
77
78
85
88
88

From the table it can be seen that prior to the 1981 change in
the law, only a very small proportion (1-3%) of delinquency
filings were disposed of through transfer to criminal court.
After the change in the law, there was a dramatic shift. In 1982,
nearly 9% of the juvenile court's caseload was channeled away
from the juvenile justice system and into the criminal court.
Since that time, smaller but nonetheless substantial proportions of delinquency filings have been transferred.
Most of the rise in the transfer rate clearly is attributable to
the broadening of provisions governing prosecutorial waiver.
Prior to the change in the law, approximately half of all transfers were prosecutorial waivers. Following the change in the
law, prosecutorial waivers constituted an increasingly greater
proportion of transfer cases, up to almost 90% in 1986 and
1987. Similar declines in both indictment and judicial waiver
occurred at the same time, with the decline in judicial waiver
being most striking (down to 12% in 1987).
IV.

INTERVIEWS WITH PROSECUTORS

While aggregate data such as those reported above are
both necessary and helpful, they leave several very important
issues unaddressed. For example, it is important to consider
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how prosecutors reacted to their expanded powers, both in
terms of their philosophical views regarding the transfer of
juveniles to criminal court, and in terms of the policies and procedures they established to apply the law. We are concerned
with how prosecutors' personal orientations toward juvenile
justice influenced their perceptions of the utility and appropriateness of transfer; with whether the change in the law had any
impact on their perceived ability to achieve valid and desirable
goals; and with how the change in the law affected practice
throughout the state.
We were able to gain some insight into these issues
through telephone interviews with juvenile prosecutors in each
of the state's twenty judicial circuits." The individuals interviewed were either the chiefs ofjuvenile divisions or they were
in substantial ways responsible for developing or implementing
prosecutorial policy relating to juvenile transfer. 3 '
Prosecutors generally reported that they were pleased with
the 1981 change in the law, primarily because it expanded their
discretionary authority over a practice upon which they look
favorably. While virtually all respondents indicated that they
were pleased with their increased transfer powers, half indicated that they wished the change had been even more farreaching. Most of this latter group wished that the law had
made it easier to transfer juveniles under sixteen years of age.
Several felt that sixteen- and seventeen-year-old misdemeanants lacking prior felony adjudications should also have been
made eligible for prosecutorial waiver. One expressed the view
that prosecutorial waiver decisions should not be encumbered
by any age or offense restrictions whatsoever.
33. To conduct the telephone interviews, we set up appointments with
the key prosecutor in charge of transfer policy and administration in each
circuit. All prospective interviewees agreed to participate. Prosecutors were
asked to set aside approximately 45 minutes for the interview. The interview
schedule was five pages in length and included both fixed response and openended questions. The time required to complete the interview varied from a
low of 35 minutes to a high of more than 2 hours. The average interview
lasted approximately I hour. The interviewers took notes on all open-ended
responses, attempting to record them as near to verbatim as possible. As a
check on the accuracy of these recorded statements, the interviewers
repeated summarizations of their notes, giving respondents an opportunity
to confirm or correct them.
34. In a number of cases, the researchers were already acquainted with
the interviewees or other prosecutors in the circuits. In a few instances, the
researchers and prosecutors had previously discussed in face to face
interviews many issues relating to juvenile transfer.

290

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

Equally interesting were the views of those who did not
feel that further expansions of the law were desirable. These
respondents expressed concern that provisions of the current
law have considerable potential for abuse. They worried that
persons less ethical than themselves--or those who were sometimes overzealous in seeking harsh punishments for juvenile
offenders-would transfer inappropriate cases. Such concerns
seemed to be tied to the perception that prosecutors decide
which cases to transfer without any standards to guide them.
Indeed, our interviews indicated that this fear was not without
foundation.
Most prosecutors had not, in fact, established any formal
policies. With one clear exception, 3 5 at best they reported having established informal policies that called for them to review
transfers initiated by attorneys under their supervision. Generally these division chiefs believed such a review process to be
adequate to ensure that staff initiated prosecutorial waiver only
in appropriate cases. However, several expressed considerable
doubt that their counterparts in other circuits were as careful as

they were in overseeing staff decisions.36
Our interviews also provided a basis for examining the

relationship between prosecutors' personal philosophies of or

orientations toward juvenile justice and their views regarding
transfer. Prosecutors' philosophies of juvenile justice varied
widely. Not too surprisingly, however, their orientations
tended to resemble models that are currently the source of
considerable national debate among policymakers. The philosophies may be categorized as falling under a "pure" just
deserts model, a "modified" just deserts model (i.e., one that
ties together just deserts with some utilitarian goal such as
deterrence), and a traditional rehabilitative model of juvenile
justice. 7

Prosecutors holding the pure just deserts viewpoint
argued that some punishment is called for in virtually all juve35. The exception is Dade County. For a discussion of developments
that took place there, see Gelber (1984).
36. Not only was it a common perception among prosecutors that
operations in other circuits were not managed as well as their own, but it was
also common for prosecutors to suggest that levels of care and standards
used by others in the exercise of discretion were too low. There is reason to
believe that prosecutors' reservations about practices outside their own
jurisdictions were not unfounded: Prosecutors in the state have fairly
frequent exchanges and develop a broad familiarity with each others'
operations.
37. For a brief but succinct discussion, see L. EMPEY, AMERICAN
DELINQUENCY: ITS MEANING AND CONSTRUCTION (1982).
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nile cases and that transfer, at the very least, ensures the
achievement of this goal. They believed that traditional juvenile justice responses, as .routinely applied, had no beneficial
effects. In fact, they tended to believe that juveniles were made
worse by the juvenile justice system's tendency toward leniency. In their view, "soft" responses deprecate the seriousness
of crime and do a disservice to victims. Nonetheless, this group
did not expect punishment to produce much, if anything, in the
way of reform. For them, the appeal of transfer was that it balanced the scales of justice by providing punishment that was
due. Transfer allowed prosecutors to move juveniles from a
system where real punishment was not possible to a system that
had punishment as a primary goal.
The second group of desert-oriented prosecutors held just
as strongly as the first to the view that punishment was essential. Unlike the first group, however, these prosecutors saw
punishment as a means of protecting the community and
preventing future crimes. Interestingly, some deterrent value
was attributed to transfer even in cases that ultimately did not
result in conviction. The filing of an information in criminal
court virtually assured pretrial detention in adult jails for the
vast majority of transfers. Further, if youths were ultimately
convicted, transfer opened the possibility of further incarceration in jails and prisons. This group expressed the hope that
punishment of young offenders might "turn them around" by
exposing them to the very serious punishments that they risk in
the adult system.
Both the pure and the modified just deserts types accepted
viewpoints that are completely antithetical to the basic precepts
traditionally associated with juvenile justice. Indeed, many of
these prosecutors expressed contempt for the juvenile justice
system, most especially for the social service personnel who
staff the majority ofjuvenile justice positions (e.g., intake workers, detention staff, probation officers, training school personnel). These punishment-oriented prosecutors, who make up
nearly half of our respondents and who are charged with representing the state's interests in delinquency cases, constitute a
continuing challenge to those who defend the traditional juvenile system.
The third philosophy, one held by a slight majority of
respondents, endorsed the traditional principles of juvenile
justice. It was this group's view that prosecutorial waiver
should be a last resort-reserved for those rare offenders who
have already failed to benefit and who cannot now benefit from
the programs available in the juvenile justice system. Once

292

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 5

prosecutors in this group defined transfer as necessary, they
hoped that rehabilitation might occur in the adult system, but
most expressed concern that simple punishment and incapacitation were all that the criminal justice system could provide.
Policymakers would like to believe that prosecutors' opinions about juvenile crime and about transfer of jurisdiction
would provide some basis for predicting their behavior. However, we found that prosecutors' stated philosophies and their

perceptions of their own practices were almost totally unrelated. As might be expected, prosecutors endorsing a desertbased philosophy indicated that they used the direct file option
often. In fact, however, if we use their own estimates of the
proportion of eligible cases in which they initiated waiver, they
generally were no more inclined to transfer youths than were
those who adhered to a rehabilitative orientation. Even though
half the respondents believed that juveniles should be transferred only as a last resort, many of them transferred as high a
proportion of cases as those prosecutors reporting a more
punitive stance. Virtually every prosecutor, regardless of orientation toward juvenile justice, reported having increased the
transfer of juveniles to criminal court following the 1981
change in the law.
While it may seem paradoxical that the "last resort" prosecutors transferred as many juvenile offenders as more punitive
types, this result makes sense when one understands that many
rehabilitation-oriented prosecutors believed that they were
forced to transfer youths sooner than they would prefer. They
pointed out that some liberal juvenile justice reforms-for
example, de-institutionalization-have had the unintended
consequence of reducing the rehabilitative options available to
the juvenile court, thus making transfer more likely. 38 They
feared that increased use of transfer might be mistakenly interpreted as rejection of a rehabilitative philosophy: They were
keenly aware that Florida's expanded prosecutorial waiver provisions had shifted the spotlight away from those who adhere to
traditional precepts of juvenile justice and toward those with
more punitive orientations. Several "last resort" types
lamented the fact that it was necessary to transfer youths
because the state had failed to invest sufficiently in juvenile
treatment programs. They indicated that they would use the
transfer option much less frequently were treatment programs
38. Like many other states, Florida recently has closed several training
schools and, as a result, many prosecutors observed that there is a real need

for alternative residential programs for juvenile offenders.
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available, especially residential programs in secure facilities
that would satisfy concerns for public safety.
V.

TRANSFER PRACTICES IN

Two COUNTIES

We gathered data in two counties regarding all cases in
which transfer to criminal court was initiated over the period
January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1984. (N=583) Information
was drawn from prosecutors' and clerks' files, as well as from
records of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services. 9 The two'counties include a midsized urban area in
the mid-Atlantic region and a large urban area in the center of
the state. These sites were selected in part because the juvenile division chiefs in each area had held their positions since the
first prosecutorial waiver legislation was passed and had maintained careful desk logs containing information on all cases in
which transfer to criminal court had been initiated.40
Our initial concern is whether cases in which transfer was
sought by the juvenile division were indeed adjudicated in
criminal court. Criminal prosecutors may evaluate cases very
differently than juvenile division prosecutors. 4 ' For example,
criminal division attorneys may view cases involving juveniles
as relatively minor, either because they involved "first offend39. In each county, we began with prosecutors' records of cases in
which a transfer to criminal court was initiated by the juvenile division. We
then checked clerks' records for case processing information. From
prosecutors' and clerks' files, we obtained information regarding
sociodemographic characteristics of juveniles transferred, charges cited by
the prosecutor's juvenile division, disposition of the case by the prosecutor's
criminal division, charges filed in criminal court, criminal court adjudication,
and sentence. From DHRS' statewide computerized database, we obtained
information on the offense histories of juveniles transferred. These data
included information on previous offenses for which each youth had been
referred to the intake division of the juvenile justice system as well as the
dispositions of each of these prior referrals.
40. Although we anticipated that practices and outcomes in the two
counties might be sufficiently different to warrant separate presentation of
findings, they were so similar that, for most purposes we have combined the
data to simplify the presentation. Of our total sample of 583, 198 cases were
from the smaller county, 385 from the larger.
41. See, e.g., Roysher and Edelman, Treating Juveniles as Adults in New
York.- What Does It Mean and How Is It Working?, in MAJOR ISSUES IN JUVENILE
READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY 265-93 (J.
Hall, D. Hamparian, J. Pettibone, and J. White eds. 1981); Fagan, Rudman,
and Hartstone, System Processing of Violent Juvenile Offenders: An Empirical

JUSTICE TRAINING AND INFORMATION:

Assessment, in AN ANTHOLOGY ON VIOLENT JUVENILE OFFENDERS 117-36 (R.
MATHIAS, P. DEMURO, AND R. ALLINSON eds. 1984); but see P. GREENWOOD, A.
ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCE SEVERITY FOR
YOUNG ADULT OFFENDERS

(1984).
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ers" to the adult system or because their offenses are less serious than those of the adult offenders whose cases they
routinely review. As a result, substantial numbers of transfer
cases may "fall through the cracks," acted upon in neither juvenile nor criminal court.
In the smaller of the two counties, almost a third (32%) of
the cases in which transfer was initiated were not prosecuted in
criminal court. In half of these, no action was taken in the
criminal division after the case was forwarded by the juvenile
division. In the remainder, a criminal division prosecutor initially filed a bill of information but later terminated processing
through a nolle prosequi. While some of these cases may have
come back to the juvenile division for filing at a later date, our
interview data suggest that the vast majority of these cases were
not prosecuted in either court. 2
In contrast, in the larger county only 14% of the cases
transferred by the juvenile division were not prosecuted in
criminal court. This level of case attrition is quite low, especially when one considers the variety of factors that may affect
decisions not to prosecute (e.g., insufficiency of the evidence,
lack of victim cooperation, inability to locate witnesses,
exchange of immunity from prosecution in return for testimony
in cases involving co-defendants).
Importantly, it seems that the difference in the criminal
court handling of juveniles in the two counties is largely attributable to differences in bureaucratic practices, rather than to
differences in the seriousness or perceived prosecutorial merit
of cases. In the smaller county, juvenile division prosecutors
screened cases for transfer and forwarded them to the criminal
division with a recommendation for criminal prosecution.
Criminal division attorneys then decided whether to accept the
juvenile division's recommendation. In many instances, crimi42. Juvenile division prosecutors indicated that if the criminal division
did not believe a case had prosecutorial merit, they would not take action in
juvenile court. In addition, legal restrictions made it almost impossible to file
cases in juvenile court after review by the criminal division. Florida law
contains a provision requiring that petitions be filed in juvenile court no later
than 45 days after the initial referral to the juvenile system's intake division.
Our interviews with prosecutors indicated that this time constraint made it

extremely difficult for most cases not acted upon by the criminal division to
return to the juvenile division for filing, given the time required for review by
the juvenile division in making the initial decision to transfer and the time
required by the criminal division did not give priority to juvenile transfer
cases, and, not bound by a 45-day rule applicable to adult defendants,
routinely took considerably longer than the juvenile division to process
referrals received.
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nal division attorneys failed to act in a timely fashion and cases
were lost for violation of speedy trial rules. By contrast, in the
larger county the juvenile division chief personally filed bills of
information in criminal court. The transfer took place unless a
criminal division attorney intervened to stop it. Thus, juvenile
offenders in the two counties were at different levels of risk for
criminal prosecution largely because of idiosyncracies in the
organization of the prosecutors' offices. These findings represent a clear illustration of what Feld has called "justice by
geography." 45
We turn next to an examination of characteristics of cases
filed in criminal court.4 The most common rationale surrounding transfer of juveniles presupposes that prosecutors
carefully select youths for remand to criminal court who are a
particularly intractable group of dangerous offenders who cannot benefit from further juvenile justice intervention.45
Indeed, in both counties studied, the chief prosecutors assured
us that this was the case. However, the reality of the situation
differed considerably from this expectation. If we accept as a
criterion of dangerousness the commission of a felony against
persons, we find that only 29% of transfers met this standard.
Most (55%) were charged with property felonies. Half of these
involved unarmed burglaries. A small proportion (l1%)
involved felony drug charges, and a few youths (5%) were
charged with misdemeanors.
Moreover, the trend has been toward transfer of greater
proportions of nonviolent felons and misdemeanants.4 6 For
example, in 1981, 9% of transferred youths were charged with
felony drug offenses and misdemeanors. By 1984, this group
constituted 22% of all prosecutorial waivers. While the proportions of felony property offenders remained fairly stable,
the proportions of felony person offenders declined substantially. In 1981, 32% of transferred youths were charged with
felony person crimes, compared to 20% in 1984. Based on the
offense charged, few of the juveniles transferred by prosecutors
43.
44.
majority
juvenile

Feld, supra note 30.
Nearly all (93%) of the transferred youths were male, and a
(63%) were white, somewhat less than the proportion white in the
population in the two counties. A majority (60%),of the youths

transferred were 17 at the time of their offenses, and many were nearing their
18th birthdays. A smaller number (37%) were 16; only 3% were 15.
45. See, for example, Breathwaite and Shore, Treatment Rhetoric Versus

Waiver Decisions, 72J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY CRIME & DELINQ. 53 (1986).
46. For similar findings with respect to waiver in four states. see
Champion, supra note 10.
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*to criminal court would seem to be the kinds of dangerous
offenders for whom transfer is most easily justified.
To explore the issue of whether transferred youths are
nonamenable to treatment, we asked whether juvenile justice
system resources had been ekhausted prior to prosecutorial
waiver. We also examined youths' prior records to look for evidence of chronic offending. We found that only 35% of the
youths previously had been committed to a juvenile residential
program. Most (58%) had previously served terms of probation or received court-ordered sanctions such as restitution or
community work service. In 23% of the cases, transferred
youths were first offenders who had had no opportunity to benefit from any juvenile justice programming. In the vast majority of cases, then, the full range of dispositional alternatives
available to the juvenile court had not been exhausted prior to
transfer.
With regard to records of offending, as we have already
noted, nearly one quarter of youths transferred were first
offenders. Slightly more than a third (34%) had one or two
prior referrals. Less than half (41%) had three or more priors.
While there has been a shift in recent years toward transferring youths charged with less serious offenses, there has also
been a trend toward transferring youths with longer records.47
As a group, youths transferred in 1984 were more frequent but
less serious offenders than youths transferred in earlier years.
Overall, these findings suggest that youths transferred via
prosecutorial waiver were not unequivocally dangerous. While
most were charged with felonies, only a small proportion were
charged with offenses against persons. In addition, there is little evidence that they were intractable: nearly one-fourth had
'no prior record and very few had multiple prior offenses.
Finally, we turn to the dispositions of the cases transferred
to criminal court. A high proportion (96%) of transferred
youths were convicted. Nevertheless, the vast majority did not
incur severe sanctions. While some postconviction incarceration was ordered in 61% of the cases, nearly half received jail
sentences of short duration.48 Prison sentences were ordered
in 31% of the cases. Of those receiving prison terms, 54%
were sentenced to three years or less, 31% to four to six years,
and 15% to seven or more years. It should be noted that Florida has very generous gain time provisions. Once these are
47. For example, in 1981, 27% of transferred youths had three or more
priors, compared to 60% in 1984.
48. Many were sentenced to "time served."
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applied, sentences served average only about one-third of the
original sentence.
Moreover, as might be expected from the earlier discussion of transfer trends, rates of incarceration have declined in
successive years as youths have been transferred for less serious offenses. While 81%6 of those convicted in 1981 received
sentences of incarceration, this was true for only 51 7 of transfers sentenced in 1984.
VI.

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The prosecutorial waiver provisions of Florida law afford
prosecutors extraordinary discretion to transfer juveniles to
criminal court. The law provides no guidance in selecting cases
appropriate for transfer other than to direct prosecutors to
transfer cases "when the public interest requires it."
At the general level, our analyses indicate two important
points for discussion. First, in light of the scope of the authority that they are given, prosecutors seem to have exercised considerable restraint in the application of the direct file statute.
Despite the fact that Florida law makes the majority of sixteenand seventeen-year-old offenders eligible for transfer, prosecutors transfer only a small proportion of eligibles. Second, and
somewhat paradoxically given this apparent moderation, few of
the youths that are transferred seem appropriate for transfer.
Our analyses indicate that youths transferred via prosecutorial
waiver are seldom the serious and chronic offenders for whom
prosecution and punishment in criminal court are arguably
justified.
Our interviews uncovered several factors that seem to have
persuaded prosecutors to exercise restraint in applying the
direct file option. For example, sharp increases in juvenile
transfers in the days and weeks immediately after the 1981
change in the law were met with opposition by prominent and
vocal members of the Florida judiciary. These officials were
successful in bringing statewide attention to the issue. Several
agencies-both public and private-identified direct file as a
critical issue and organized lobbying efforts aimed at revising
the law to reduce prosecutorial discretion. These efforts
continue.
In some regions, intraorganizational pressures also played
a part in inducing prosecutors to select modest numbers of
cases for transfer. In many jurisdictions the initial reaction of
juvenile division prosecutors to the expanded transfer provisions greatly increased the workloads of criminal division attor-
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neys.4 0 This resource strain prompted pressure on juvenile
division attorneys to retain more cases in the juvenile justice
system.
The establishment of sentencing guidelines in Florida in
1983 also seems to have influenced transfer rates and practices.
The guidelines made it unlikely that offenders without extensive prior records would receive sentences of incarceration.
Consequently, prosecutors began to delay transfer to accumulate points in juvenile court that could be applied for criminal
sentencing purposes.' Waiting for offenders to accrue convictions in juvenile court is a fairly common practice, referred to
by one prosecutor as "giving them enough rope to hang
themselves."
Restraint in the exercise of prosecutorial waiver is no
doubt attributable as well to the fact that a small majority of
prosecutors held firmly to the traditional philosophy underlying the juvenile justice system. It is interesting that so many
juvenile division prosecutors accepted so completely precepts
of juvenile justice favoring rehabilitation, especially when one
considers that there is little institutional support for such viewpoints among prosecutorial workgroups. 5 '
That these "last resort" types felt compelled nonetheless
to transfer a substantial number of cases to criminal court is a
reflection not of the weakness of their philosophical positions
but of the practical realities of juvenile justice in Florida. The
closing of juvenile training schools and other residential facilities--originally given impetus by the liberal de-institutionalization movement, later sustained by fiscal conservatism-has
meant that there are few opportunities for rehabilitation
remaining in thejuvenile system. Few beds are available in residential programs and lengths of stay have been cut sharply in
an effort on the part ofjuvenile justice officials to accommodate
the demand. In the face of these constraints-which are not
unique to Florida-the trend toward transfer of greater numbers of youths to criminal court is likely to continue unabated.
Prosecutors believe that the legislature should support the
49. There was nothing in the Juvenile Justice Act that anticipated
substantial shifts in caseload pressures, so staff resources in criminal divisions
tended to remain stable.
50. Juvenile convictions are weighted as heavily as adult convictions
under Florida's sentencing guidelines.
51. Several rehabilitation-oriented prosecutors told us they were
viewed in pejorative terms by their associates (i.e., as the "soft on crime,
social worker types"). A few even indicated that they believed their prospects
for promotion and enhancement in the office were impaired-by their views.
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development within the juvenile justice system of a variety of
community-based and residential treatment options, equipped
with sufficient staff and programmatic resources to provide
realistic prospects for rehabilitation.
The second major finding of this study is that many
prosecutorial waivers are inappropriate when evaluated in
terms of the justifications traditionally offered for transfer of
jurisdiction. The lack of statutory guidelines to direct
prosecutorial decision-making has resulted in inconsistent and
varying "policies" that fail to target the most serious and
chronic juvenile offenders. In the two counties studied, fewer
than 20% of youths transferred were charged with felonies
against persons. Moreover, of those charged with other felonies, the trend was toward transfer of youths charged with
lesser felonies and misdemeanors. We did find a trend toward
transfer of youths with extensive prior records. However, in
the most recent year studied, a substantial proportion of transfers had fewer than three priors and less than half had been
previously committed to residential programs.
Many seventeen-year-olds were transferred who had
neither committed serious felonies nor accrued lengthy prior
records. The chief reason appeared to be that they were nearing their eighteenth birthdays. In these cases, prosecutors
were clearly exploiting the lack of guidelines governing
prosecutorial waiver, in effect rewriting the law that sets the
upper age limits of juvenile court jurisdiction.
Troubling questions about the even-handed administration ofjustice arise when we consider the fact that bureaucratic
arrangements in the two counties we examined accounted for
wide variations in the risk of transfer to criminal court. That
such vagaries impact on transfers is not surprising, however.
The state legislature's failure to delineate clear procedures and
specific criteria to govern waiver decisions made it almost inevitable that arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making would
result. Our interviews revealed much descensus across state
attorney's offices regarding policy orientations toward juvenile
justice in general, and waiver in particular. Under such conditions, the potential for differential treatment of similarly situated youths is great.
The lack of guidelines both for selecting youths for transfer and for implementing transfer decisions are not the only
reasons that prosecutorial waiver decisions in Florida seem to
be arbitrary and largely inappropriate. A number of other factors contribute as well.
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As discussed above, Florida law mandates that juveniles
charged with capital and life felonies be transferred to criminal

court via grand jury indictment. Consequently, in selecting
cases for prosecutorial waiver, prosecutors of necessity choose
from a pool of eligibles from which the- most dangerous and
violent offenders have already been excluded.
Moreover, when the law was changed in 1981, some prosecutors felt they had been given a mandate by the legislature,
responding to public demand, to transfer greater numbers of
delinquency

cases

to

criminal

court.

Prior

to

1981,

prosecutorial discretion over the transfer of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds was carefully circumscribed by offense and prior
record restrictions. The removal of these restrictions may have
led many

prosecutors

to

conclude

that the legislature

encouraged the transfer of less serious offenders.
Finally, the ease with which prosecutorial waiver is accomplished contributes to its use. Interview data attest to this

point, as indicated by the many respondents who expressed
uneasiness about the ways that the direct file provisions were

being applied. Both the lack of statutory criteria to aid in
selecting cases for direct file and prosecutors' ability to bypass
judicial or public oversight of their decisions encourage less
care and thoughtfulness than is desirable in the administration
of justice.
We believe that the optimal solution is the abolition of
prosecutorial waiver, in favor of relying on both legislative
exclusion and judicial waiver. Prosecutorial waiver is fraught
with dangers of misapplication and abuse primarily because it
involves the unreviewable and largely hidden exercise of discretion. When this discretion is exercised, as in the present
case, without objective, substantive guidelines, it is almost inevitable that highly unpredictable and indefensible outcomes will
result.
One way of introducing greater equity and predictability to
the transfer process would be to look to the legislature to bring
more offenses (or offense/prior record combinations) within
the ambit of the legislative exclusion statute. As Feld 2 has
observed, legislative exclusion offers a rational, easily administered method of deciding which youths should be prosecuted
as adults. While this method does not eliminate discretion, it
reduces it considerably by confining it to the charging decision.
Alternatively, with the abolition of prosecutorial waiver,
judicial waiver might be relied upon more heavily. While this
52.

Feld, supra note 30, at 96.
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alternative has the advantage of being more structured than
prosecutorial waiver, the criteria that are to guide judicial decision-making are by no means unambiguous. Criteria such as
"dangerous" and "non-amenable to treatment" involve very
subjective assessments that give judges broad discretion in
making transfer decisions. Here also we would look to the state
legislature to impose a number of substantive restrictions and
clear criteria that must be satisfied before a juvenile can be
waived. We are optimistic that carefully drafted statutes can
eliminate much of the risk of inconsistent and arbitrary application. Even evaluation of such vague standards as
"nonamenability to treatment" can be made with considerable
precision (e.g., "to be adjudged nonamenable to treatment the
record must reveal at least three prior adjudications of delinquency and at least one prior commitment to a residential
treatment program").
An advantage of retaining and relying increasingly on judicial waiver is that it permits judges to "individualize" justice
within a framework in which the exercise of discretion can be
carefully circumscribed and open to review. We are also persuaded by the recent observations of the District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington, which expressed little confidence that prosecutors have the experience and qualifications
necessary to make wise dispositional decisions.' The court
characterized assistant U.S. Attorneys as "persons who may be
barely out of law school with scant life exprience and whose

common sense may be an unproven asset." These comments
apply with even greater force to assistant state attorneys, and
especially those assigned to juvenile divisions. All too fre-

quently juvenile divisions are places of first assignment for
newly hired assistant state attorneys who eventually move on to
the more prestigious criminal divisions.

We recommend that waiver decisions be made in accord
with modified and refined Kent criteria, at hearings that provide
full due process protections. These decisions are best left to
judges, experienced members of the bar who have demon-

strated their qualifications to the satisfaction of the peers who
nominate them and the public who elect them and retain them
in office.

If prosecutorial waiver is to be retained, clear statutory
standards must be provided for its application. Statutes should
include unequivocal descriptions of the target population
53.
54.

United States v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637 (E.D. Wash. 1990).
le
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appropriate. for this type of transfer, and should require that
standardized measures be used in determining which juveniles
fit. For example, "prior record" must be defined (preferably in
terms of prior adjudications, rather than referrals or arrests),
and terms like "chronic," "habitual," "serious," and "intractable" should either not be used at all or, if used, be precisely
defined, with reference to standardized indicators.
Additionally, there should be clear guidelines for implementing the statutory standards. That is, we recommend the
use of something akin to a case assessment scoring sheet that
indicates what is required to meet each standard and what total
score is necessary to make a youth eligible for waiver. This
guidelines sheet should be fully disclosed to the defense, and
there should be gome provision for a hearing to contest
unfounded assertions and inaccuracies prior to transfer.
Finally, procedures for the transfer of youths from juvenile to
criminal court jurisdiction should be standardized throughout
the state in an effort to minimize the effects of idiosyncrasies of
bureaucratic organization on the administration of justice.

